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Abstract 
 
The paper examines the technological structure of the Japanese banking sector before the onset 
of the banking crisis and structural reforms of the 90s in order to shade light on the logic of the 
recent trend to consolidation in the industry.  While diseconomies of scale are shown to be 
pervasive in the large banks, defying the rationale for consolidation, the paper presents evidence 
of an underlying technological progress that operates to significantly increase the industry’s 
efficient minimum size, generating economies at larger banks, thus justifying the ongoing trend 
in consolidation.  The results suggest that, to the extent that consumers can benefit from lower 
costs of bank production, policies that promote a more concentrated banking structure might be 
consistent with public interest.   
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1. Introduction 
The Japanese Banking industry is undergoing an unprecedented structural reform 
characterized by a wave of mergers and consolidation (see, e.g., Hall, 1999) for recent 
developments).  The ongoing trend towards bank concentration presupposes the existence of 
some form of economies that banks could exploit by being larger. The extant empirical literature 
is ambiguous about the extent of such economies in the industry.  Until recently, the consensus 
has been that significant economies of scale existed before the onset of the crisis and subsequent 
reform in the 1990s at all output levels throughout the industry (see, e.g., Fukuyama, 1993; 
McKillop et al., 1996; Tachibanki et al., 1991; and Yoshioka and Nakajima, 1987).  This is 
despite the fact that substantial evidence in other countries, notably in the U.S., suggests that 
economies of scale in banking commonly get exhausted at a low level of output.  In addition to 
the industry’s chronic problems of profitability and the debilitating effects of the banking crisis 
in the early 1990s, the logic of the recent wave of consolidation might be based on these early 
findings of significant scale economies.  On the other hand, recent research finds that the extent 
of scale economies reported in the earlier research was overstated and that, in fact, there exists 
diseconomies of scale in the large banks, thereby questioning the rationale for the recent mergers 
and consolidation (see, e.g., Altunbas et al., 2000; and Drake and Hall, 2003). 
Given the current trend towards bank concentration in Japan, understanding the precise 
nature of scale economies in the industry is critically important both to comprehend the 
economic rationale behind the industry’s movement to consolidation and to prescribe policy 
going forward. Part of the ambiguity in the literature about scale economies in the industry lies 
in the fact that the two sets of studies have focused on two significantly different periods in the  
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history of the Japanese banking industry.  While the earlier studies focus on the relatively stable 
period of the 1980s, the recent studies are based on the industry’s experience in the tumultuous 
period of banking crisis followed by structural reform and consolidation that characterizes much 
of the 1990s.   
The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent of economies of scale in the Japanese 
banking industry and shade more light on the rationale behind the recent structural changes that 
are shaping the industry. To do so, the study focuses on the relatively stable period of much of 
the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s before the onset of the banking crises that culminated 
in the recent structural reform.  In contrast, Drake and Hall (2003) and Altunbas et al. (2000) 
study the period of 1993 through 1997, a period in which the industry was in a flux of crises and 
structural reform.  Because the data reflects the impacts of the banking crisis of the early 1990s 
and the subsequent and ongoing reform, it would be difficult to make meaningful inference about 
the existence and extent of scale economies as a justification for consolidation, while the 
industry is at the same time going through the very reforms.  It is shown that, in contrast to the 
early studies, but consistent with the recent ones, while there were significant scale economies in 
much of the industry, diseconomies was pervasive among the large banks that became the object 
of the consolidation wave in recent years.  While this finding prima-facie defies the logic for 
large-scale mergers, the paper argues that a significantly scale-biased technological progress has 
been underway countering the diseconomies of scale in large banks.  In other words, despite the 
static diseconomies observed in the data, there was a dynamic technological process that has 
been significantly increasing the minimum efficient scale in the industry, reducing the observed 
diseconomies and potentially creating economies from a larger scale.  Focusing on the sub- 
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period after the passage of the 1981 New Banking Law of Japan for robustness, the study reports 
a much lower level of scale dis-economies, providing additional credence to the argument that 
the observed diseconomies were dissipating over time.  
In addition to providing the economic rationale for the structural changes in the industry, 
the paper also contributes to the study of banking production economies in general. An extensive 
literature exists on the cost structure of the banking industry, particularly on the question of 
whether or not firm size (scale) creates any economies. Despite differences in methodology and 
data sources
1 the evidence, mainly from the U.S. and few other countries, has been remarkably 
similar, in that, generally, depository institutions exhaust scale economies at low levels of 
output, and at the average bank, there is little evidence of economies of scale. Despite the critical 
role of banks in the Japanese economy, the cost structure of the banking industry has not 
attracted much attention in academic research.  This contrasts to the extensive literature on banks 
in the U.S. where banks’ role relative to financial markets is not as important as in Japan.  The 
paper attempts to fill the void by providing a detailed study of the cost and technological 
structure of the industry based on a large panel extending over two decades. There exist at least 
two reasons why Japanese banks yield themselves as an interesting case to examine bank 
production economies.  First, during the decade of 1980s they have proven to be the fastest 
growing banking industry in the world.  Second, since the early 1980s, the Japanese banking 
industry has undergone a series of financial deregulation, including the recent mergers and 
consolidation, which should affect the structure of the industry.  Hence, investigation of scale 
                                                           
1 The early studies include those by Benston (1965, 1972), Greenbaum (1967), and Bell and Murphy (1968) and are 
summarized in Benston (1972).  Recent works -including Benston, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1982), Murrey and White 
(1983), Gilligan Smirlock, and Marshall (1984), Hunter and Timme (1986), Kim (1986), Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey  
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economies in the process of high growth and structural liberalization provides a unique 
opportunity to further our knowledge of bank production economies.    
Evaluating the extent of these economies per se contributes to the public policy issues 
related to the appropriate size of banks in the industry.  Concern on the social costs of attaining 
monopoly power through size has long been at the center of the public debate on deregulation.  
This is particularly true during the recent period of mega mergers in Japan.  However, as Hunter 
and Timme (1986, 1991) argues, the appropriate scale of banks as well as the cost implications 
of size are also influenced by the characteristics of technological advancement in the industry.  If 
new technologies are non-neutral in terms of their effects on the efficient size of the firm in the 
industry, then policies that encourage creation of large-scale banks can be socially beneficial.  
The second objective of the paper is, therefore, to evaluate the impact of technological change on 
Japanese banking industry.  Towards this end, the study follows Hunter and Timme (1991) and 
examines technological change, its relationship to bank size and its effect on the efficient scale 
of operation for Japanese banks. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 below presents the empirical 
model utilized to characterize the Japanese banking production technology and offers operational 
measures for scale economies, technological change and input elasticities. Section 3 describes 
the data, and section 4 presents empirical results.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1987), Mester (1987), Noulas, Ray, and Miller (1990), Fields, Murphy and Tirtirglu (1993) and Berger and Mester (1997) 
- studied the cost structure of financial institutions in the U.S., Canada, Israel and Turkey.    
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2.  Empirical Model 
We follow the parametric approach of inferring the technological characteristics of the 
bank production process from structured production functions as representation of the underlying 
technology.  Invoking the duality between production and cost functions in characterizing the 
technology, we use the cost function to infer the extent of scale economies, technological change 
and other relevant properties of the production process.  
2.1. The Cost Function 
Consistent with the literature (see, e.g., Uchida and Tsutsui (2004) in Japanese banking 
context), it is assumed that the production process of the Japanese banking industry can be 
depicted by the following twice differentiable, one-output, four-inputs production function: 
Y     =     f ( D , L , K , B ) ,              ( 1 )  
where Y is output and D,L,K,B denote the inputs of deposit, labour, capital and borrowing, 
respectively
2.  We adopt the "intermediation approach" in which deposits combined with labor, 
capital and borrowing are assumed to be utilized to produce loans as output.  Table 1 lists 
definitions of relevant variables.  We model the production process as a one-output technology 
for Japanese banks to abstract from the study of economies of scope. While the literature is 
consistent in finding scale economies and technological change in banking, the consensus, 
though the evidence is mixed, holds that significant scope economies are hard to find in banking 
(see, e.g., Mester, 1987; and LeCompte and Smith ,1990)). Similarly, Clark (1994) reports large 
economies of scale for all classes of banks in the U.S., but no evidence of scope economies.   
                                                           
     
2  Defining the inputs and outputs for a financial services firm's production process is a major problem in bank 
production economies studies. For an excellent discussion of the related issues see Clark, 1988.  
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Insert Table 1 here.   
From duality theory, if producers pursue cost minimizing behavior, the production 
function can be uniquely represented by a dual cost function of the following form:
3 
C = h(y,wi,t)  , for i = D,L,K and B            (2) 
where, C is the total cost (including interest costs), wi = input prices for i = D,L,K and B, and t is 
the index of time which proxies for technology.  As Hunter and Timme (1991) describes, when 
time is used as an index of technology, any change in a bank's total cost, holding all other 
variables constant, is attributed to technological innovation.  However, the variable, being a 
residual index, captures the effects of all other omitted variables including the impact of 
technology. Hence, caution should be exercised in interpreting the coefficients on the time 
indicator.  
The explicit functional form assumed for equation (2) is the standard translog 
specification.  A translog function provides a flexible functional form where it does not restrict 
the second-order properties of the cost structure examined.
4 The specification has also been used 
for characterizing Japanese banks’ technologies (see, e.g., Uchida and Tsutsui, 2005)). A recent 
alternative to the translog functional form is a Fourier Flexible form, which augments the 
translog function by adding trigonometric terms of the log of output. The extra flexibility 
associated with the Fourier Flexible form is considered to provide a better fit to data (see, e.g., 
Bauer and Ferrier, 1996).  However, comparing the two forms using data on 3100 Eurpean 
                                                           
     
3  To be a valid representation of production technology, the cost function should satisfy three conditions: First, it 
should be a non-negative, non-decreasing function of output y; second, the cost function must be non-negative, non-
decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous, concave and continuous in input prices wi and, finally, it should be twice 
differentiable with respect to wi (Chambers (1988)). 
     
4In contrast to the conventional Cobb-Douglas or CES functional forms, the translog form enables the estimation of U-
shaped average cost functions, for example.   
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banks, Altunbas and Chakravary (2001) find that despite the Fourier’s within-sample fit, the  
translog form provides superior out-of-sample prediction, and cautions against the growing use 
of the Fourier specification. Berger and Mester (1997) have also compared the translog to the 
alternative Fourier Flexible form. Despite the latter’s added flexibility, the difference in results 
between the methods appears to be negligible. Swank (1996) shows that the translog form is also 
more stable. 
The translog form used for estimation is the following second-order Taylor series 
expansion of the cost function defined in eq. (2): 
  l n C   =   Β0 + Σi=1
4 Βi lnwi + 1/2Σi=1
4Σj=1
4Βijlnwilnwj + Σi=1
4Βiylnwilny   (3) 
+ Σi=1
4ΒitlnwiT + Βylny + 1/2 Βyylny
2 + ΒytlnyT + ΒTT + 1/2 ΒTTT
2  
By Shephard's Lemma dlnC/dlnwi represents an equation for the cost share of input i. 
Hence, we have a system of equations, consisting of the cost function given in (3) and the 
following four share equations, one for each input i: 
ln C/lnwi = Βi + Σj=1
4Βijlnwj + Βiylny + ΒitT ,  i = D,L,K and B.    (4) 
Imposing the usual restrictions to reflect homogeneity of degree one in input prices    
(Σi=1
4 Βi  = 1;  Σj=1
4Βij = 0; Σi=1
4Βiy = 0; Σi=1
4Βit = 0) and symmetry (Βij  =  Βji). 
These restrictions imply dropping the share equation of one of the inputs, using the associated 
input price as a numeraire.  The input price of borrowing was used as a numeraire in the 
estimation
5. 
  Having introduced the characterization of the production technology, the empirical 
                                                           
     
5Arbitrarily dropping one share equation raises the issue of whether parameter estimates would be insensitive to the choice of 
which equation is deleted.  However, as long as Iterated Zellner's SUR are used on the remaining share equations, the estimated 
parameters estimates are invariant to the choice of the share equation. (Oberhofer and Kmenta (1974)).   
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investigation is organized in the following order.  First, we provide a battery of tests to identify 
the global characteristics of the underlying technology and verify the appropriateness of the 
particular functional form adopted in the paper in representing this technology.  This is done to 
avoid inappropriate inference owing to econometrically misrepresenting the technology. The 
empirical tests include tests of whether the underlying production process exhibits homotheticity, 
homogeneity, constant returns to scale, and whether it is consistent with a more restrictive Cobb-
Douglas specification. In addition, to increase confidence in our inference and compare with 
bank technologies in other countries, we present standard estimates of elasticities of substitution 
among the identified bank inputs.  Second, having established reasonable confidence on the data 
and estimation, the paper proceeds to investigate the focal issue of the study, namely, the extent 
of scale economies and its interaction with technological change to find a rationale for the 
current wave of mega mergers in the industry.   
To evaluate the global characteristics of the banking technology, we impose the implied 
parametric restrictions and conduct standard comparison of the restricted models against the 
unrestricted translog version. A homothetic technology implies the restriction that 
 Βyy = Βyt =   0 ;           ( 5 )  
a homogeneous production function (homogeneous with respect to output) reflects the 
restrictions of 
Βiy = 0,  in addition to (5) above;            (6) 
and a technology that exhibits constant returns to scale requires the restriction of (in addition to 
(5) and (6)) 
Βy  =   0 .            ( 7 )   
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Finally, a Cobb-Douglas specification implies, in addition to (5), (6) and (7), the following 
restriction: 
Βij = Βiy    =   0 .           ( 8 )  
To characterize the nature of the production process further as represented by the cost 
functions, we estimate the Allen elasticities of substitution and elasticities of conditional input 
demands. From the cost and share equations, the measures of the Allen elasticities of 
substitutions are defined as (where Si = cost share of input i): 
σij = Βij/Si*Sj - 1/Si + 1 , for i = j, and            (9a) 
σij = Βij/Si*Sj + 1 for i ≠  j         ( 9 b )  
The related own- and cross-partial elasticities of conditional input demand are given by: 
εij = Βij/Si + Si - 1 ,  for i = j, and            (10a) 
εij = Βij/Si + Sj ,  for i ≠  j.          (10b) 
2.2. Scale Economies 
From the cost function, returns to scale
6 measures cost responses associated with changes 
in output, holding input prices constant.  Scale economies are said to exist if an increase in 
output, at constant input prices, leads to a less than proportional increase in total costs, causing a 
decline in average costs. 
Given a cost function of the form in (3), the measure of scale economies is defined as 
follows:    
                                                           
     
6 Note that, although closely related, the measure of scale economies using the production function (elasticity of scale) is 
different from the measure of scale economies using the cost function (elasticity of size). The elasticity of scale measures how 
output changes as one moves out along a ray from the origin in an input space while the elasticity of size measures how cost 
responds as we move along the locus of cost-minimizing points in input space (i.e., along the expansion path).  The two measures 
coincide only for homothetic production functions (i.e., where we have ray expansion path).   In this paper, we will use the 
concepts of returns to scale and returns to size interchangeably.   
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S = 1/(dlnC/dlny) = 1/ [Αy + Σi=1
4Βiylnwi +  Βyylny + ΒyTT ].    (11) 
An estimate of S > 1 implies scale economies, indicating that an equiproportional increase in all 
inputs of a firm result in a more than proportional increase in output. Evidence of scale 
economies, other things constant, could be a rationale for consolidation. 
2.3. Technological Change   
Technological change refers to an inward movement in the production isoquants in the 
input space, in which the same level of output can be produced with at least one input bundle in 
which the quantities of each input is less than what used to be required.  From the cost side, 
holding input prices constant, technological change permits the firm to produce the same level of 
output at lower expenditure.  Given the cost function in (3), the rate of technological change 
(RTC) can be measured by: 
RTC = - dlnC/dlnT = - (ΑT +ΒTTT + Σi=1
4Βitlnw + Βyt lny)    (12) 
The estimate of technological change is composed of three components: (a) pure 
technological change, ΑT +ΒTTT; (b) input-biased (non-neutral) technological change, 
Σi=1
4Βitlnw; and (c) scale-augmenting technological change, Βytlny (see Altunbas et al., 1999).  
Pure technical change is the rate of reduction in total costs attainable, holding constant both the 
efficient scale of production and the shares of each of the inputs in total cost.  Technological 
change, however, can be biased with respect to inputs as well as with respect to the scale 
characteristics of the production technology.  With regard to input biases, a technological change 
is Hicks-neutral, if the slope of the production isoquants is independent of technological change. 
 A cost-neutral technological change, an analogous (but not equivalent) concept, refers to a 
technical change that does not affect relative cost shares of inputs.  From the share equation in  
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(4), a measure of input bias in technological change is: 
TIB = dlnSi/dlnT = Βit, i = D, L, K and B          (13) 
A TIB = 0 imply a neutral technical change.  TIB > 0 and TIB < 0 imply ith factor-using and ith 
factor-saving technological advancements respectively. 
Technological change could also be biased with respect to the scale property of the 
production technology.  Technological change may be scale-biased or non-neutral in the sense 
that it might alter the range of outputs over which a given scale economies can be attained, thus 
resulting in a change in the cost-minimizing efficient firm size.  Define the cost elasticity to be 
C=1/S, S=elasticity of scale.  Technological scale bias is given by: 
TSB =  -(dC/Dt) = d{-dlnC/dlny}/dT = -Βyt      ( 1 4 )  
A TSB > 0, implies that technological change increases scale economies and, conversely, 
if TSB< 0, scale economies are decreasing as a result of technological progress.  A scale-
increasing technological progress (TSB > 0) implies that the minimum efficient size (MES) at 
which the average cost is the lowest is increasing due to technological innovations.  Thus, a 
scale-increasing technological change, other things constant, could induce industry consolidation 
over time; by contrast, a scale-decreasing technical change, could precipitate industry 
fragmentation. 
3. Data 
The data set includes end-of-year data on costs and outputs constructed from the financial 
statements of those Japanese banks with complete financial information for the sample period of 
1974-1991. Data are obtained from Nihon Keizai Shimbun America, Inc.  The Japanese banking 
system constitutes four functional categories of banks:  City Banks, Long-Term Credit Banks,  
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Trust Banks and Regional Banks.  The City bank group is composed of the nation-wide 
branching financial institutions that are traditionally the major suppliers of short-term finance to 
the nation’s large corporations.  They also have significant client base from small businesses and 
the household sector. In 1996, for example, they account for close to 50 percent of the Japanese 
loan market (Uchida and Tsutsui, 2005).  City banks fund their operations from deposit taking 
and short-term borrowings.  They are also engaged in investment banking activities, have 
significant international operations, and represent some of the largest banks in the world.   
The Long Term Credit banks are specialized banks, established under the Long Term 
Credit Bank Law of 1952 for the purpose of providing long-term finance to fund the nation’s 
drive to industrialization.  They are the only type of banks allowed to issue debentures to fund 
their lending operations. They are also distinguished from City banks by the length of maturity 
of their loans, which are considerably longer, and by the extent of their branch networks which 
are smaller.  Two of the original three banks in this category have recently been privatized. 
The other specialized banks are the Trust banks that are engaged in long-term financing 
as well as trust operations. They fund their operations from trust accounts, and provide long-term 
loans to mainly large corporations.  In addition, they are engaged in saving and deposit activities, 
fund management, stock transfer and real-estate brokering activities. 
Regional banks are ordinary banks that are engaged in deposit taking and financing of 
small businesses at a local level.  They are smaller in size, and have limited branching with 
strong local ties. They raise funds from deposits much of which comes from the household 
sector, and provide business loans to medium and small enterprises, and invest in local and 
money markets.   
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There were 13 City banks, 3 Long-Term Credit banks, 11 Trust banks (including 4 saving 
and loan associations) and 132 Regional banks, at one time or another, during the sample period. 
Out of these, 11 City banks, 3 Long-Term Credit banks, 8 Trust banks, and 91 Regional banks 
have complete records over the entire sample period. The pooled cross-sectional time series data 
consists of 2034 usable data points.  
Insert Table 2 
Table 2 presents a summary of the data for the full sample.  To standardize the data, the 
input prices were indexed using the input prices associated with the mean observation (i.e. the 
firm-year whose output is the closest to the mean output level) as base prices. There is a wide 
variation in both costs and output in the sample.  At the mean level, deposits account for about 
60 percent of costs, followed by labor and borrowing. Panel B provides a year-by-year summery 
of the average size and number of banks of the four types of banks included in the sample.  The 
11 city banks and the 3 Long-term banks represent the largest banks in the sample and the 91 
regional banks, which constitute the majority, consist of the smallest banks. 
4. Empirical  Results 
4.1.  Tests of restrictions on the cost function 
The cost function in equation (3) and three of the associated four share equations are 
estimated simultaneously using Zellner's Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
technique in which the estimates are asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood 
estimators (Kmenta and Gilbert, 1968)).  
The parameter estimates of equation (3), their standard errors and t-statistics are  
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presented in Table 3
7.  All estimates except one are statistically significant at the one percent 
level.  The goodness-of-fit measures for the cost equation and the estimated share equations are 
given in Panel B of Table 3. 
Insert Table 3  
Tests of the restrictions imposed on the cost and share functions reject the hypothesis of 
homotheticity implied in restrictions (5) (see Panel C of Table 3).  The cost function, therefore, 
is not separable between output and input prices, indicating that the relationship among costs, 
output and input prices cannot be characterized globally.   
The strong rejection of homotheticity implies rejection of homogeneity.  The direct test 
for homogeneity, Panel C of Table 3, also rejects the hypothesis.  Both global constant returns to 
scale and Cobb-Douglas specifications are also strongly rejected.  In short, none of the 
assumptions underlying the more restrictive production structures offer a valid representation of 
the Japanese banking technology.  The production technology over the sample period is 
consistent with a non-homothetic production process, also providing credence for the use of a 
less restrictive functional form, such as the translog cost function, as a representation of the 
underlying production process. 
To further illuminate on the nature of the production process, Table 4 (Panel A) presents 
the estimates of the Allen elasticities of substitution computed at the point constituting the 
'average' firm in the sample. First, we note that all inputs are substitutes
8.  Borrowing (a financial 
                                                           
 
     
7The matrix of the Allen substitution elasticities, evaluated at the mean of the sample, is negative semidefinete.  The cost 
function is, therefore, concave.   Monotonocity is satisfied as the fitted shares are positive at all observations.   Monotonocity 
(with respect to output) is satisfied because dlnC/dlnY > 0 at the point of expansion (dlnC/dlnY = 1.0371184). 
     
8Inputs are classified as complements if the Allen elasticity of substitution has a negative sign and substitutes if it has a 
positive sign.  
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input) is a strong substitute for each of the other factors. There is strong substitutability between 
the financial inputs (deposits and borrowing), which is consistent with previous research (see, 
e.g., Noulas et al., 1990 for large U.S. banks).   The results also show strong substitutability 
between the physical inputs (labor and capital), which is again consistent with the extant 
literature on bank technology (see, e.g., Mester, 1987 and Murray and White, 1983) for the thrift 
industry in the U.S. and Canada, respectively, and Noulas et al., 1990)).  The degree of 
substitution between deposits (a financial input) and the physical inputs (capital and labor) is 
relatively small.  
Insert Table 4 here 
 The own- and cross-price elasticities of conditional input demands presented in Panel B 
of Table 4 provide results consistent with priors and available evidence. All own-price 
elasticities are negative, with all input demands except for borrowing being slightly price 
inelastic.  The cross-price elasticities contain much of the same information contained in the 
elasticities of substitution and indicate substitutability among all inputs.  Increases in cost of 
deposit induce increased use of borrowing but very slight response in labor and capital 
utilization.  Bank borrowing in the open market (other than deposits) also responds relatively 
highly for increases in wages and capital costs. Bank borrowing, in this case, represents mainly 
bank issuance of marketable instruments such as notes.  Increases in capital costs cause a modest 
increase in labor use. Overall, Table 4 provides additional assurance that our representation of 
the Japanese banking technology is reasonable and comparable to experiences in other countries. 
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4.2.  Scale Economies  
We now return to the main focus of the study, namely the evaluation of the extent of 
scale economies and technological change in the industry.  Rejection of homotheticity (Table 3 
above) implies that estimates of scale economies, technological change and elasticities are not 
constant across observations. As a result, therefore, we follow a convention described by Mester 
(1987), in which measures of the focal estimates of the paper (scale economies, technological 
change and elasticities) are evaluated for three representative banks. The first constitutes the 
observation consisting of the means of output and input prices (the "average" bank), the second 
is the minimum value of the output variable with mean values of input prices (the "small" bank), 
and the third is the maximum value of the output with mean values of input prices (the "large" 
bank). These bank types are identified both for the entire sample and for each banking categories 
(i.e., City, Long-Term, Trust and Regional banks).  The 'average bank', the 'small bank' and the 
'large bank' of a banking category consist, respectively, of the mean, the minimum and the 
maximum output value of the output variable (y) of the bank category with the overall mean 
values of input prices and the variable t. As these focal estimates are not linear functions of the 
estimated parameters, exact standard errors cannot be computed.  The standard errors of the 
statistics that are nonlinear in parameter estimates are computed as the standard deviations of the 
first order Taylor series approximations of the respective statistics around the parameter 
estimates.
9   
Table 5 presents the estimates of scale elasticities, measured in accordance with 
                                                           
     
9 To elaborate, let F be a vector of statistics that are functions of the vector of estimated parameters, Β.   The approximate 
variance-covariance matrix of the statistics is given by dFVdF', where, dF is the matrix of the gradients of F with respect to the 
parameters evaluated at the point estimates and V, being the variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates.  
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expression (11), for both the full sample and each of the bank categories.  For the full sample, we 
have evidence that the scale measure decreases as bank size increases with 'small' banks 
exhibiting significant scale economies and 'average' and 'large' banks displaying significant dis-
economies.  This is consistent with the substantial evidence, based on the U.S. experience, as 
summarized in Clark (1988).  The scale elasticity is significantly less than one for the 'average' 
and 'large' banks.  The elasticity is significantly greater than one only for the 'small' banks.  
Relative to the wide variation in size, the differences in the scale measures do not appear to be 
significant.  
Insert Table 5 here 
As noted, the data set includes the few very large City and Long Term banks as well as 
the small regional banks that constitute the majority; thus the "average" bank at which the scale 
elasticity is evaluated is not truly representative.  (The distribution of size is skewed to the left).  
In fact, observation of the estimates of scale over the entire data set reveals that about 80 percent 
of the sample has scale elasticity significantly higher than one.  In other words, on a plot of 
average costs against output, which is a U-shaped, the majority (80 percent) of data points fall on 
the declining portion (i.e., an average cost function with a much longer declining portion).  Thus, 
except at the few cases of extremely large size, there appears to be significant economies of scale 
for the majority of banks, particularly banks of smaller size than the "average" size.  This is 
further supported by the sub-sample estimates for Regional banks.   Note that Regional banks 
dominate the sample in number, constituting 91 of the 113 banks in the sample. Moreover, as 
shown in Table 2, regional banks tend to be small in size, the 'average' Regional banks being the 
smallest of the average banks of all other bank categories and smaller than the average bank for  
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the full sample. The 'average' Regional bank exhibits significant scale economies.  This evidence 
of scale economies in the majority of banks is consistent with Yoshioka and Nakajima (1987) in 
which they report significant economies of scale for Japanese City banks and Regional banks. 
From the sub-sample estimates, we again observe declining scale elasticity as bank size 
increases in each bank category.   For City bank and Trust bank categories, 'small' banks exhibit 
significant scale economies with 'average' and 'large' banks exhibiting substantial dis-economies. 
 Long-Term Credit banks appear to be too big to benefit from scale economies.  Cross-
categorical differences in scale estimates are related to variation in bank size distributions across 
categories. 
To investigate the behavior of scale economies over time, we first define the cost 
elasticity (C) to be the reciprocal of scale elasticity (S), so that C < 1 and C > 1 imply existence 
of economies and dis-economies of scale respectively.  dC/dT = Βyt measures the degree to 
which scale economies improve over time.  A dC/dT > 0 imply that the percentage increase in 
cost due to a one percent increase in output increases over time, suggesting a decline in the 
degree of scale economies.  Put differently, a dC/dT > 0 imply that the minimum efficient firm 
size (MES) – the firm size at which the long-run cost is at minimum - has decreased over time.  
This is the size of the firm in long run equilibrium, at which all economies of scale are 
exhausted.   
The negative dC/dT = Βyt in Table 3 implies that the degree of scale economies for the 
Japanese banking industry has, on the average, increased over the 1974-91 period. This is also 
evident from Panel B of Table 5 where the yearly estimates of scale elasticities for the typical 
bank are provided.  The scale dis-economies of the ‘average’ size bank has decreased over the  
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sample period – scale economies for such a bank improved from 0.89 in 1974 to 0.98 in 1991.  
The output level at which the minimum average cost could be attained has increased over the 
period, which is to say that the range of output over which average cost can be reduced through 
increase in scale has expanded over time. A related interpretation is to say that the attained 
technological advancement (discussed below) exhibits inherent positive scale bias.   This finding 
is consistent with the evidence in Hunter and Timme (1986 and 1991) in which they report a 
positive scale-biased technological change for large U.S banks, whereby the cost-minimizing 
bank sizes increased. Furthermore, the evidence implies that the technological progress 
underlying bank production in Japan has been progressively favoring or requiring larger scale 
production, justifying the ongoing trend in the industry consolidation. 
4.3 Technological  Change 
Estimates of the rates of technical change are presented in Table 6. Panel A presents 
estimates for representative banks for the entire sample period.  For both the full sample and the 
sub-samples of bank categories, we have evidence of significant technological advancement in 
the Japanese banking industry over the sample period.  The 'average' bank of the sample exhibits 
a rate of technical change of 0.011456 (i.e., holding output constant, a decrease in total cost at a 
rate of 1.1456% per annum); the largest banks experienced a 2.1045% annual reduction in cost; 
and the smallest banks exhibited no technical change. The results are qualitatively similar across 
bank categories, with the largest cost savings reported for City banks and the smallest for 
Regional banks. In Panel B, the rate of technical change has steadily increased during the sample 
period from 0.5% per annum in 1974 to 1.7% in 1988 and 1.3% in 1991.   The overall evidence 
on existence of technical change is consistent with Hunter and Timme (1986 and 1991) in which  
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they also report significant technological change for large U.S. banks.  
Insert Table 6 
Furthermore, the rate of technical change (i.e., the percentage reduction in cost per 
annum) increases with bank size, with the 'small' bank and the 'large' bank, of both the full 
sample and the respective sub-sample of bank categories, experiencing the smallest and the 
largest rates in the respective categories. In fact the cross-categorical differences in the rate of 
technical change are related to variations in size distribution of banks across categories.   
To provide more insight into the relationship between technological change and scale, we 
define TSB = d{- dlnC/dT)}/dlnY (i.e., the derivative of the rate of technical change with respect 
to scale).   From equation (14), TSB = -Βyt.  From Table 3, TSB = 0.0036 with a t-stat of 4.99, 
implying that larger Japanese banks attain significantly higher rate of technical change than 
smaller banks.  While this may not be conclusive about differences in the innovative capacity of 
banks of different size,
10 the evidence indicates that technological change operated to reduce 
costs for larger banks more rapidly than for smaller banks.  The question of innovative 
advantages aside, therefore, a public policy that promotes larger banks appear to be justified on 
the basis of the discriminatory effects of technological change which tend to favor larger banks.   
Moreover, the technological change appears to be biased with respect to factor use.  The 
measures of factor share bias, TIB = Βit (in accordance with equation (13)) are positive for 
deposits and negative for labor, capital and borrowing (see Table 3), all being statistically 
                                                           
     
10An issue related to the relationship between scale and technological change concerns whether larger firms innovate faster 
than smaller firms.  Large-scale operation might be argued to be conducive for technological advancements.  The traditional 
Galbraith-Schumpter hypothesis is that, since development of innovations is costly, large firms operating with larger research 
budget should be able to innovate faster than small-scale firms, reducing costs at a faster rate than small-scale firms do 
(Stevenson (1980)).   Also certain technical advances can only be utilized in large-scale firms.  Some production techniques may 
not be employed by or simply may not be available to small-scale firms.    
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significant.  The cost share of deposit input goes up while that of labor, capital and borrowing 
falls.  
Another perspective can be gained from decomposing the total technical change into its 
components – pure, scale augmenting and input biased technical changes. From Table 2, the 
coefficients of pure technical change, ΑT and ΒTT are both positive and significant, implying that 
the impact of pure technical change has been to increase rather than decrease total costs during 
the period. One the other hand, the coefficient of the scale augmenting technical change, Βyt, is 
negative and significant. This implies that the technological change has been scale biased, 
increasing the efficient minimum size of production; this bias, in turn has resulted in cost 
reductions for banks at an increasing rate during the sample period. The impact of input bias 
technical change has been to increase the use of deposit at the expense of the other inputs. The 
decomposition of the rate of technological change for the ‘average’ bank, which is 1.145 % is -
3.93% attributable to pure technical change, -0.27% to input-biased technical change, and 5.35% 
attributable to scale augmenting technical change. Thus it appears that the inherent scale-bias of 
the technological change was a significant force that was dictating the economics of bank 
production during the sample period.  
As a comparison, these findings for Japanese banks are broadly consistent with what has 
been documented for U.S. banks in the 80s and early 90s. A number of studies measured 
productivity growth, including technical change for U.S. banks in the 1980s. Summarizing the 
literature, Berger (2003) concludes that a general finding was that bank productivity growth was 
negative in early 1980s and may have improved slightly in the latter 1980s and early 1990s. 
Stiroh (2001) and Berger and Mester (2003) report increases in total cost for U.S. banks over  
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1991 through 1997. Humphrey (1993) finds that technical change had a negative impact in the 
U.S. after deregulation.  Berger and Mester (2003) find a decline in bank productivity of 12.5% 
per annum, reflecting mainly negative impacts of technical change, while at the same time 
reporting positive profit productivities.  This could be a reflection that banks have provided an 
improved set of services (e.g., mutual funds, on-line services, etc.) that has increased bank costs, 
and that they were able to raise revenue to cover these costs. However, for this to happen, the 
banks must have enjoyed some form of market power, perhaps through increased scale. 
To summarize, the foregoing provides evidence of technological patterns that favor 
industry concentration.  On the one hand, the production technology exhibits existence of static 
diseconomies of scale for the largest banks during the period, defying, prima-facie, the logic for 
consolidation.  On the other hand, the evidence also indicates an underlying technological 
progress that has been operating to increase the comparative advantages of large-scale operations 
in the industry.  First, the size of the scale economies has been increasing over time.  This means 
that the technological progress has been operating to increase the minimum efficient size, the 
scale of operation at which total cost is minimized, making large-scale production the efficient 
competitive size.  Second, the production process exhibits a scale-biased technological progress, 
a process whereby technological innovations and inventions appear to benefit larger-scale 
production. We should also note that diseconomies were not pervasive throughout the industry; 
in fact, the majority of the banks, Regional banks in particular, exhibit economies of scale. 
Hence, contrary to the implications of the observation on the static diseconomies of scale, the 
dynamics of the technological progress that has been shaping the Japanese industry provides 
strong rationale for bank consolidation and concentration.     
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5.  Scale Economies and Technological Progress in 1982-91 
To check for the robustness of the results so far, we present additional evidence based on 
the industry’s experience during the sub-period in the 1980s. The banking sector of Japan 
underwent a series of liberalization during this period. While the financial reform of the industry 
had many facets and has been a continuous process, the consensus is that one of the major events 
that marked the beginning of the reform process is the passage of the 1981 New Japanese Bank 
Law (see, e.g., Bank of Japan (1995)). We evaluate scale economies and technological change 
over the relatively more liberalized period of the sample period over 1982 through 1991.  
The results are presented in Table 7. Again the cost function is consistent with a non-
homothetic production process. Panel A indicates that, as in the full sample, during this sub-
period, the industry exhibits significant diseconomies of scale. Economies of scale decrease as 
bank size increases with 'small' banks exhibiting significant scale economies and 'average' and 
'large' banks displaying significant dis-economies.  The sub-sample estimates, in each bank 
category, also show declining scale elasticity with increase in bank size.  For Long-term bank 
and City bank categories, all sizes of firms exhibit substantial dis-economies while the small and 
average Regional firms report significant economies of scale.  Cross-categorical differences in 
scale estimates are related to variation in bank size distributions across categories. 
Again, although the 'mean' bank of the sample reports dis-economies, the majority of 
banks have smaller size than the average firm. The distribution of firm size is skewed to the left. 
 Observation of the estimates of scale economies over the entire data set reveals that, in both sub-
periods, the majority of banks have scale elasticity significantly higher than one.  Thus, except at  
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the few cases of extremely large size, there appears to be significant economies of scale for the 
majority of banks.   This is further supported by the presence of significant scale economies in 
Regional banks, which constitute above 80 percent of the sample.  
Moreover, the behavior of scale economies during this sub-period indicates a 
technological progress that significantly increased the minimum efficient size. Defining C to be 
the cost elasticity (1/S), the dynamics of scale elasticity over time is measured by dC/dT, which 
is evaluated to be significantly negative for the sub-period, implying increases in the minimum 
efficient size. dC/dT= Βyt = -0.0020562 (with standard error of 0.000239) for the sub-period.   
Panel B reports the estimates of rates of technical change (RTC) for the sub-period.  We 
have evidence of significant technological advancement in Japanese banking industry over the 
sub-period.  The 'average' bank of the sample exhibits a rate of technical change of 0.013864 
(i.e., holding output constant, a decrease in total cost at a rate of 1.3864 percent per annum); the 
largest firm experienced a 1.718 percent annual reduction in cost; and the smallest firm exhibits 
no technical change. The results are qualitatively similar across bank categories, with the largest 
cost savings reported for city banks and the smallest for regional banks.  Cross-categorical 
differences in the rate of technical change are related to variations in size distribution of banks 
across categories.    
Furthermore, the technological progress exhibits significant scale bias. TSB = d{- 
dlnC/dT)}/dlnY measures the impacts of scale on technological change, and are -Βyt = 
0.0020562. This is consistent with the presence of underlying technical progress that is evolving 
to increase the comparative advantages of larger-scale bank production relative to small banks. 
The evidence based on the data in the 1982-91 sub-period supports the main results from  
  25
the full sample.  While Japanese banks exhibit significant scale diseconomies, particularly at 
large banks, before the onset of the recent banking crises and subsequent reform, there is 
evidence of an underlying technological progress that worked to increase the efficient size of the 
average bank.  Hence, the dynamics of technological change that has been operating to favor and 
necessitate large-scale banking, despite the observation of diseconomies, provide the economic 
rational for consolidation in the industry. 
5. Conclusion 
The unprecedented structural reform of the Japanese Banking industry has prompted 
questions about its economic rationale.  While industry consolidation presupposes the existence 
of some form of economies of large-scale production, recent studies fail to find significant scale 
economies to justify the recent wave of mergers and consolidation. This paper argues that the 
rationale for the recent trend in consolidation lies in the nature of the technological progress that 
has swept the industry in recent times.  
In spite of observation of diseconomies of scale, there has been an underlying change in 
bank technology that has increased the minimum efficient size as well as favored large banks to 
smaller ones.  Studying the evolution of the industry over a relatively long period of 1974 
through 1991, the paper examines the degree of scale economies and the dynamics of the 
technological progress of the underlying banking production. It reports slight dis-economies of 
scale for particularly the large banks, and significant scale economies for smaller banks, that 
constitute about 80 percent of the industry. This is particularly true for Regional banks that 
dominate the industry in number.  On the other hand, the evidence shows existence of a 
technological change that has operated to lower the cost of production, with larger banks  
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achieving higher cost reductions. There is evidence that the underlying technological progress 
has increased the comparative advantages of large-scale production in the industry.   
Furthermore, and more directly, the evidence shows that, over the period, the underlying 
technological progress sweeping the industry has been increasing the industry's minimum 
efficient size – i.e., the scale of production at with total cost is minimized. Hence, the 
technological dynamics that have been operating to favor and necessitate large-scale banking, 
despite the observation of diseconomies, provide the economic logic for consolidation in the 
industry. The results further suggest that, to the extent that consumers can benefit from lower 
costs of bank production, policies that promote a more concentrated banking structure would not 
be inconsistent with public interest.  
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Table 1:  Variable Definitions 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Output (y)          Personal loans + industrial loans + investments in cash dues 
and         securities 
Costs (C)          personnel expenditures + fees and commissions + capital 
related expenses + interest expenses 
Inputs: 
Labor  (L)     number  of  employees 
Capital (K)        area of building occupied by the bank's facilities 
Deposits  (D)     total  deposits 
Borrowing (B)        total funds borrowed from intermediary sources 
Input Prices: 
Labor (wL)         Personnel expenditures/# of employees 
Capital (wK)        Capital costs (Depreciation, rentals etc)/area of building 
Deposits(wD)     interest  on  deposits/total  deposits 
Borrowing(wB)        interest costs of funds obtained/total borrowing   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2:  Summary of Data 
 
Panel A:  Summary of variables 
 
Variable 
 
Minimum 
     Value 
Mean 
      Value 
Maximum 
           Value 
C  Total Cost (million Yen) 
y  Output (million Yen) 
SD  Share of Deposits 
SL Labor  share 
SK Capital  share 
SB  Share of Borrowing 
wD  Price of Deposits 
wL  Price of Labor 
wK  Price of Capital 
  wB  Price of Borrowing 
2821 
110470 
.00757 
.018473 
.01186 
.000945 
.000786 
.925023 
.011799 
.014111 
203067 
3186165 
.599519 
.194755 
.093599 
.112127 
.033870 
5.031902 
.086060 
            .277735 
4210019 
46518392 
.812597 
.374311 
.210333 
.869266 
.100504 
14.9334 
                   0.907335 
                   0.437200 
Panel B:  Size of the average bank and the number of banks in the sample by year 
Year City  Banks 
Regional 
Banks Trust  Banks 
Long Term 
Banks Year  City  Banks 
Regional 
Banks 
Trust 
Banks 
Long 
Term 
Banks 
1974  15.55 (11)  13.24 (91)  14.88 (8)  15.64 (3)  1983  16.58 (11)  14.19 (91)  15.81 (8)  16.50 (3) 
1975  15.66 (11)  13.38 (91)  15.00 (8)  15.78 (3)  1984  16.70 (11)  14.28 (91)  15.97 (8)  16.62 (3) 
1976  15.76 (11)  13.51 (91)  15.11 (8)  15.88 (3)  1985  16.74 (11)  14.34 (91)  16.05 (8)  16.68 (3) 
1977  15.86 (11)  13.62 (91)  15.18 (8)  15.96 (3)  1986  16.90 (11)  14.42 (91)  16.20 (8)  16.77 (3) 
1978  15.97 (11)  13.75 (91)  15.25 (8)  16.03 (3)  1987  17.02 (11)  14.52 (91)  16.25 (8)  16.89 (3) 
1979  16.10 (11)  13.86 (91)  15.34 (8)  16.09 (3)  1988  17.15 (11)  14.63 (91)  16.36 (8)  16.96 (3) 
1980  16.20 (11)  13.93 (91)  15.45 (8)  16.21 (3)  1989  17.31 (11)  14.78 (91)  16.51 (8)  17.10 (3) 
1981  16.38 (11)  14.03 (91)  15.61 (8)  16.33 (3)  1990  17.43 (11)  14.89 (91)  16.52 (8)  17.15 (3) 
1982  16.49 (11)  14.11 (91)  15.76 (8)  16.44 (3)  1991  17.44 (11)  14.91 (91)  16.51 (8)  17.16 (3) 
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Table 3: Estimate of the Cost Function  
_____________________________________________________________________________   
Panel A:  Parameter Estimates 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                           Parameter       Estimate       Std Err       T-stat       Prob>|T| 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
                         A0               2.140025      0.44548          4.80       0.0001 
                              A1               0.357368       0.02823        12.66       0.0001 
                              A2                0.848069     0.0094660        89.59      0.0001 
                              A3                0.358044     0.0055355        64.68       0.0001 
                              AY              -0.292148       0.06408         -4.56       0.0001 
                              AT                0.029323     0.0098414           2.98       0.0029 
                              B11               0.134691     0.0030313        44.43       0.0001 
                              B12             -0.105281     0.0019550      -53.85       0.0001 
                              B13             -0.051066     0.0011483      -44.47       0.0001 
                              B1Y             0.006624    0.0019577           3.38       0.0007 
                              B1T               0.010831     0.0004378        24.74       0.0001 
                              B22               0.100367     0.0017828        56.30       0.0001 
                              B23             0.002000     0.0009538           2.10       0.0361 
                              B2Y             -0.038541     0.0006345      -60.74       0.0001 
                              B2T           -0.007720   0.0001769      -43.64      0.0001 
                              B33               0.045861     0.0008693        52.76       0.0001 
                              B3Y             -0.016601     0.0003685      -45.05      0.0001 
                              B3T           -0.002214    0.0000999     -22.15      0.0001 
                              BYY               0.088088     0.0046300        19.03       0.0001 
                              BYT           -0.003576    0.0007172         -4.99       0.0001 
                              BTT             0.001054     0.0002941            3.59       0.0003 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Goodness-of-fit Measures 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Equation          DF        SSE       MSE          Adj R-Sq  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
LTC               2003    62.41184    0.03116    0.9909    
SDEPOSIT           2013    21.80300    0.01083    0.1519    
SLABOR             2013     1.71090    0.0008498    0.8047    
SCAPITAL          2013    0.54938    0.0002729    0.6432   
______________________________________________________________________________  
Panel C:  Structural Tests 
 _____________________________________________________________________________ 
T e s t       R e s t r i c t i o n s    L L R    Π
2 (at 0.001) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Homotheticity        4   2046.20   18.5 
Homogeneity          5   2124.81   20.5 
CRS           6   1955.35   22.5 
Cobb-Douglas      12   4814.18   32.9 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4:  Elasticity of Substitution 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A:  Allen Elasticities 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Deposit  Labor   Capital  Borrowing 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Deposit  -0.29326* 
(0.08433) 
Labor    0.09831*   -1.4885* 
(0.01674)   (0.04700) 
Capital    0.08997*   1.1097*  -4.4491* 
(0.02046)   (0.0532)  (0.09923) 
Borrowing    1.3222*   1.1335* 1.3054* -10.1277* 
(0.03213)   (0.03626) (0.04376) (0.21118) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B:  Direct Elasticities 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Deposit  Labor   Capital   Borrowing 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Deposit  -0.17582*   0.019146*  0.008421*  0.14825* 
(0.00506)   (0.00326) (0.00192) (0.00360) 
Labor    0.058937*   -0.28989*  0.10387*  0.12709* 
(0.00990)   (0.00902) (0.00483) (0.00401) 
Capital    0.053938*   0.21612*  -0.41643*  0.14637* 
(0.01227)   (0.01019) (0.00929) (0.004907) 
Borrowing   0.79266*   0.22074*  0.122218*  -1.13558* 
(0.0000)    (0.00706) (0.00410) (0.023668) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Significant at 1%. 
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Table 5:  Elasticity of Scale Estimates 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A: Scale Elasticity estimates over full sample period. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Bank Type      'Small' Bank    'Average' Bank  'Large' Bank 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Long Term Credit Banks*  0.97119    0.86270    0.80588 
(0.00205)   (0.00856)   (0.01283) 
City  Banks*    1.00529   0.85246   0.78537 
(0.00118)   (0.00929)   (0.01452) 
Regional  Banks*   1.41466   1.05168   0.87017 
(0.01531)   (0.00272)   (0.00804) 
Trust  Banks*    1.34662   0.91670   0.83148 
(0.01344)   (0.00503)   (0.01083) 
 
Full  Sample*    1.41466   0.96421   0.78537 
(0.01531)   (0.00238)   (0.01452) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Yearly estimates of Scale Elasticity for the “Average” bank. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1974     0.896089
*     1983   0.973987
*   
   (0.0024)       (0.0023) 
1975     0.914615
*     1984   0.964235
*  
   ( 0.0034)       (0.0024) 
1976     0.924334
*     1985   0.970613
*    
   ( 0.0032)       (0.0023) 
1977     0.936865
*     1986   0.982246
*    
   ( 0.0029)       (0.0021) 
1978     0.936648
*     1987   0.976554
*  
   ( 0.0032)       (0.0023) 
1979     0.934204
*     1988   0.99273
*  
   ( 0.0031)       (0.0020) 
1980     0.931084
*     1989   0.996069
*  
   ( 0.003)      (0.00198) 
1981     0.944056
*     1990   0.988869
*    
   ( 0.0027)       (0.00216) 
1982     0.961146
*     1991   0.978255
*  
   (0.0040)       (0.00219)    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
The ‘average’ bank represents the observation consisting of the average of output and input prices, the “small” bank 
represents the observation with the minimum value of the output variable with mean values of input prices, and the 
“large” bank constitutes the observation with the maximum value of the output with mean values of input prices. 
* Significant at 1%.  Figures in parenthesis are approximate standard errors of 1/S, where S= elasticity of scale. 
Table 6:  Estimates of Rates of Technical Change  
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________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A: Rates of Technical Change over full sample period. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Bank Type      'Small' Bank    'Average' Bank  'Large' Bank 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Long Term Credit Banks  0.011153*    0.016411*    0.019729* 
(0.00098)   (0.00176)   (0.00237) 
City  Banks    0.009350*   0.016976*     0.021045* 
(0.00088)   (0.00186)   (0.00261) 
Regional  Banks   -0.0019532   0.0079534*   0.016007* 
(0.002037)   (0.001303)   (0.00169) 
Trust  Banks    -0.0005028   0.013638*   0.018178* 
(0.002037)   (0.001303)   (0.002078) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Full  Sample    -0.0019532   0.011456*   0.021045* 
(0.002305)   0.001013)   (0.00261) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Yearly estimates of Rates of Technical Change. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1974     0.005409
*     1983   0.011063
* 
   ( 0.0014)       (0.00108) 
1975     0.005973
*     1984   0.011838
*  
   ( 0.0013)       (0.001148) 
1976     0.007818
*     1985   0.012422
*    
   ( 0.00128)       (0.001318) 
1977     0.009668
*     1986   0.014648
*    
   ( 0.00125)       (0.001133) 
1978     0.012363
*     1987   0.016564
*  
   ( 0.00133)       (0.001211) 
1979     0.010596
*     1988   0.017154
*  
   ( 0.00129)       (0.00115) 
1980     0.007699
*     1989   0.016146
*  
   ( 0.00123)       (0.001112) 
1981     0.009246
*     1990   0.012402
*    
   ( 0.001193)       (0.001059) 
1982     0.010307
*     1991   0.012797
*  
               (0.001126)       (0.00108)    
______________________________________________________________________ 
The ‘average’ bank represents the observation consisting of the averages of the output variable and input prices, the 
“small” bank represents the observation with the minimum value of the output variable with mean values of input 
prices, and the “large” bank constitutes the observation with the maximum value of the output with mean values of 
input prices. 
* Significant at 1%. 
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Table 7:  Estimates of Elasticity of Scale and Technological Change (1982-1991) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Bank  Type     'Small'  Bank   'Average'  Bank 'Large'  Bank 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A:  Elasticity of Scale 
 
Long Term Credit Banks    0.97100*    0.87712*    0.82668* 
(0.0000)   (0.00976)   (0.01540) 
City  Banks     0.99986*   0.86810*   0.80824* 
(0.0000)   (0.01073)   (0.01762) 
Regional  Banks    1.32432*   1.03865*   0.88368* 
(0.02045)   (0.00331)   (0.00907) 
Trust  Banks     1.27306*   0.92424*   0.84952* 
(0.01802)   (0.00488)   (0.01278) 
 
Full  Sample     1.32432*   0.96505*   0.80824* 
(0.02045)   (0.00643)   (0.01762) 
 
Panel B:  Technological Change 
 
Long Term Credit Banks    0.013759*    0.015577*    0.016725* 
(0.00629)   (0.00703)   (0.00792) 
City  Banks     0.013269*   0.015773*   0.01718* 
(0.00627)   (0.00716)   (0.00834) 
Regional  Banks    0.009228   0.012653*   0.015438* 
(0.00868)   (0.00635)   (0.00694) 
Trust  Banks     0.097291   0.014619*   0.016188* 
(0.00819)   (0.01386)   (0.01718) 
 
Full  Sample     0.009227   0.013864*   0.017180* 
(0.00868)   (0.00630)   (0.00834) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Significant at 1%.  Figures in parenthesis are approximate standard errors for 1/S, where S=elasticity of scale 
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